EXTENSIONS
Jetkvm
Operate a JetKVM from swamp: health checks and Tailscale updates. The JetKVM web UI does almost everything over a WebRTC data channel, so video, USB, version and settings are not on HTTP and there is no snapshot endpoint; this model reads the unauthenticated /metrics page for the app version and NTP state, and everything else over SSH as root (developer mode, key auth, host key pinned or already known; never trust-on-first-use). health flags app and system firmware updates (via JetKVM's release API), USB gadget not enumerated, low disk, clock skew, and Tailscale down, offline, out of date or missing its boot script; with the optional tailnetIp it also fetches /metrics over the tailnet, which catches a node deleted from the tailnet that tailscaled still reports as Running. Reads and writes are separate methods: tailscale reports status or plans an update and never changes the device; tailscaleUpdate always acts, behind labeled live pre-flight checks (installed, boot script, free space, tailnet path, no swap already running). The device has no CA store, so `tailscale update` cannot run on it: tailscaleUpdate downloads the official arm tarball on the swamp host, checks its sha256, streams it over SSH, backs up the running binaries, swaps them in the layout `tailscale configure jetkvm` expects, restarts tailscaled without a reboot, and rolls back by itself unless the node rejoins Running and online with the same tailnet IP (when the old one was readable) and, with tailnetIp, answers over the tailnet from the swamp host. Every update outcome is recorded as its own update instance, so a later status run never hides a failed update.
Glinet Kvm
Operate GL.iNet KVMs (Comet GL-RM1 / GL-RM1PE) from swamp: health, screenshots, ATX power and virtual media. The firmware is a fork of PiKVM's kvmd, and three of its behaviours shape this model. The factory TLS certificate is self-signed, names CN=localhost and expired in 1979, so it cannot be validated or pinned; HTTP goes through curl and the viewer through openssl, with credentials on stdin rather than argv. The video streamer sleeps until a viewer connects, so a bare snapshot request answers 503 whether or not there is a signal; screenshot and health open a receive-only viewer session first and never send input. Without the ATX add-on board, the API still reports power 'off' for a running machine; this model reports the state as unknown and refuses to press a button wired to nothing. health flags available firmware updates, missing HDMI signal, offline USB HID, forgotten virtual media that could hijack the next boot, clock skew, Tailscale (the device's own state, plus an optional probe of its tailnet IP that catches a node deleted from the tailnet, which the device still reports as Running), and security posture (2FA off, browser root shell on, untrusted TLS). Reads and writes are separate methods: atx and msd report state or record a plan and never change the device; atxPress and msdChange act, behind labeled live pre-flight checks (ATX board present and not busy; virtual media enabled and not busy).
Redfish
Read and control a server's power and boot settings over the DMTF Redfish API. One model serves any BMC: the endpoint, system and vault-wired credentials are method arguments, the TLS policy is explicit, and no credential is ever placed in a URL, log or stored state.