EXTENSIONS
Crane
A container registry driven through crane, the registry client of go-containerregistry: tags resolved to digests, images and indexes described, images mirrored in by digest, digests given tags, and a file read out of an artifact's layer, every outcome a swamp record.
Cosign
Container images signed and verified with cosign, https://github.com/sigstore/cosign, signed with a key, with or without a transparency log, verified against that key or keyless against the identity in a Sigstore certificate.
Signed Images
Nine workflows composing @dataverket/ko, @dataverket/cosign, @dataverket/flux and @dataverket/crane. `@dataverket/ko-signed-images`: a signed build, every command of one Go module built into an image by ko and pushed, every image signed by digest with cosign using a key held in a vault, every signature verified. `@dataverket/ko-signed-manifests`: signed manifests, ko resolve renders them with every ko:// image built, pushed and pinned by digest, each image is signed, the rendered manifests are attested onto it as a custom predicate, and both are verified. `@dataverket/verified-manifests`: every image a rendered manifest file names verified against a public key, read-only, a gate before a deploy. `@dataverket/signed-release`: a directory of rendered manifests pushed as one OCI artifact with flux push artifact, tagged with the commit, with a release.json listing every image by digest from this run's resolution record, the artifact signed by digest, the rendered manifests attested onto it, both verified. `@dataverket/verify-release`: the gate, read-only, the artifact's tag pinned to its digest with crane, its signature and custom attestation verified against a public key, release.json read out of its layer, every image it lists verified by digest. `@dataverket/pinned-base-image`: an upstream base image resolved to its digest with crane, held in quarantine until that digest has been the tag's for minimumAgeDays, verified keyless against the publisher's identity, copied into our registry by digest, signed with our key and verified, the mirror record then feeding ko-signed-images through baseImageFrom. `@dataverket/promote-release`: verify-release as a nested workflow, then the channel tag such as current pointed at the verified digest with crane tag and read back, the digest it held before recorded for a rollback. `@dataverket/mirror-release-images`: verify-release, then every image the release lists copied by digest into another registry with its sha256-<hex> signature tag, and verified there. `@dataverket/verified-upstream-image`: read-only, an upstream image by tag, digest or both resolved to its digest with crane and its signature verified keyless against the certificate identity and OIDC issuer of its publisher; only when an attestationType is given, also its attestation of that type, where an attestation counts only when its subject is that digest and, when asked, its provenance names exactly the source repository and commit given; with attestationType empty, which the caller must say, a pass is about the signature alone; no vault, nothing written but records; it needs @dataverket/cosign 2026.11.10.1 or later. Each run fails unless all of what it was asked happened for all of the images. Every workflow refuses an input it does not have, so a mistyped name cannot switch a check off: from the command line by its input schema, from a step of another workflow by its first assertion.
Snyk/sbom
Snyk SBOM — software bill of materials testing and analysis
Extension Probe
Pull a swamp extension into a sandbox, describe its behavior types, and run
Cve/mini Shai Hulud
Scans deno.lock and package-lock.json files for npm packages compromised
Wheelshop
Trust-gate auditor for npm/jsr packages used inside swamp extension models, plus survey, smoosh and prior-art attribution for building extensions from parts of community swamp extensions
Rust Security Catalog
Content-bound Rust security review decisions with exact reuse and conservative incremental-review planning.